![]() Suffice it to recall that the triumph of the first assault on Palmyra in March 2016 was quickly offset by a defeat in the Tabqa area while the Russian troops’ storming of East Aleppo led to a subsequent failure in Palmyra, which military intelligence special forces and Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) then had to assault a second time. ![]() In fact, “the commander-in-chief’s favorite war” - as the Syrian campaign was known in Russian military circles - had for years not been going smoothly for Moscow. 24, 2022, the undeniably poor showing of the Russian Armed Forces seemed to indicate that, to some extent, they were held hostage by their experience of the war in Syria. Instead, within weeks of launching its massive re-invasion of Ukraine on Feb. But this illusion - reinforced by the ostensible success of simultaneously keeping the Ukrainian military bogged down for seven years in a war of attrition in Donbas - gave Russia’s top military-political leadership unfounded confidence that a quick, easy victory over Ukraine would be possible. ![]() ![]() Since intervening in the Syrian civil war in late 2015 and effectively saving Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime, the Kremlin reveled in the seeming power and competence of its Armed Forces and special services. ![]()
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